Definition
Aggregate quality degradation experienced by non-targeted slices during and immediately after a slice containment event, measuring the collateral cost of security responses.
The Measurement Gap
Measurement Gap and Decision
Decision Supported: Are containment actions cleanly scoped to the compromised slice, or do they destabilize unrelated slices through resource rebalancing, and if so, how badly?
Measurement Gap:
When a security incident triggers slice containment (isolating a compromised slice from the shared resource pool) the security team focuses entirely on the compromised slice: contain the threat, investigate the breach, restore service. What no one measures is the impact on the non-targeted slices that share the same resource pool. Containment removes resources from the pool (the compromised slice's allocation is quarantined), and the remaining slices must absorb the capacity reduction. If the pool was running at high utilization, the remaining slices experience quality degradation (latency increases, throughput drops) through no fault of their own. This collateral impact is never measured, never attributed to the containment action, and never factored into containment procedure design. Enterprise customers on adjacent slices experience degradation that appears as "network performance variability" rather than as a consequence of a security event on a neighboring tenant. CCIS formalizes this measurement by tracking quality deltas on non-targeted slices during and immediately after containment events.
Citations:
- ENISA, "5G Security: Threat Landscape and Good Practices," 2024. Addresses containment procedures without measuring collateral impact on non-targeted tenants.
- 3GPP TS 33.501, "Security Architecture and Procedures for 5G System," Release 18: defines security procedures for network slicing without assessing cross-slice performance impact of containment actions.
Formula
Plain Language: When a slice containment event occurs (compromised slice isolated), measure the quality delta for all other slices in the same resource pool during the containment window and for 15 minutes after. Sum the negative deltas. Compare to a baseline of quality variation during normal (non-containment) periods.
Notation:
CCIS = Σ_j [Quality_baseline_j − Quality_during_containment_j] / N_affected_slices
Measured only for slices j that were NOT the containment target.
Variable Definitions:
- Quality_baseline_j = average quality metric (latency, throughput) for non-targeted slice j during normal periods, same time of day, same day of week (quality units)
- Quality_during_containment_j = quality metric for slice j during the containment event window plus 15 minutes (quality units)
- N_affected_slices = number of non-targeted slices in the same resource pool (count)
- Positive CCIS = collateral degradation occurred. Zero = no collateral.
Units:
Quality units (ms of latency increase, Mbps of throughput decrease, or normalized SQS). Lower is better.
Sign Convention:
Lower is better. 0 means containment caused no measurable collateral degradation.
Edge Cases:
- Containment during low-utilization periods may have zero collateral because spare resources absorb the rebalancing. Segment CCIS by time of day and utilization level.
- Containment events are (hopefully) rare. Require a minimum of 3 events to compute a meaningful CCIS. Supplement with simulated containment exercises.
- Non-targeted slices that were already at their guarantee floor (GMEI issue) will experience worse collateral because they have no buffer.
- Minimum sample: 3 real or simulated containment events per quarter.
Proposed formula, pending validation pilots.